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Good evening. This is
Radio Free Beszel.
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I am Alphonse. Tonight:
the Internet and
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the French Revolution. Many
social dysfunctions
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today are blamed on the
Internet - things like
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echo chambers, polarization,
fake news,
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conspiracy theories,
denial of science.
0:19
And the reason for all
of this is often
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given to be the technology:
the Internet,
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social media, smartphones.
And I think there are
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excellent arguments to be
made for all of that.
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And yet it seems some of this
has happened before.
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I'm going to talk about the
analysis of a French
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historian, Augustin Cochin,
who died in 1916
0:43
fighting for France in
World War I. You can
0:45
find some of his writings
in a book titled,
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Organizing the Revolution.
Cochin was
0:50
opposed to the revolution,
to its democracy,
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and to its murderous terror,
but he argued that
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the cause of this was not
the psychology of the
1:00
participants. It was not
even the circumstances.
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It was a particular form
of social organization,
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and it began decades before
the Revolution itself
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with the philosophical
societies. This was the
1:15
time in the 18th century
of the Enlightenment,
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and men across France
formed societies
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for talking about the new
ideas - for talking
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about human reason, the rights
of man, democracy.
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And these societies, Cochin
said, went astray.
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Their discussion of ideas
became detached from
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the real world, and when
the Revolution happened
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men from these societies
ended up in positions of
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influence and they tried
to apply the ideas that
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they had had in conversation.
And the results,
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as Cochin sees it, were
catastrophic. The core
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problem with these societies,
Cochin says,
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is free thought.
Now free thought
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seems like a good thing.
Free thought,
2:01
free speech - but free
from what? Cochin says
2:04
that they were free from
attachments. Freedom,
2:08
in effect, meant freedom
from reality, because
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the goal of the societies
was only to talk,
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not to act, not to do, but
just for men to talk
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and to achieve agreement.
But if their agreement
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is the assumed outcome, that
means that the test
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of success, the test of
truth, is not whether
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something corresponds to
reality, but whether the
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participants agree on it.
What the participants in
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the societies were searching
for was not truth
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but consensus and the approval
of their peers.
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And so the ideas they had
were ultimately reduced
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to mere words and forms,
and actual truth itself
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was cast aside. These societies
were egalitarian:
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every man was equal, every
man had a vote.
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That was the principle. But,
as usually happens,
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as I've talked about before
when I talk about
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hierarchy versus centralization,
that wasn't
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the outcome. A few members
were more passionate,
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more engaged, more involved
than anybody else. And
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often these were the men
who were least involved
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in the outside world. Because
if you're busy with
3:18
your job, busy with your
family, then you don't
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have that much time to go
to a talk shop in the
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evenings. And these inner
circles that sprang up,
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a few members in each
society, would end up
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directing the society as
a whole. If the society
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was going to have a formal
meeting in the evening,
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the inner circles might
meet in the morning,
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and they would talk about
the issues to be
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discussed at the later
meeting of the whole.
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And they would come to their
conclusions, and then
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they would contact other
members of the society
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and pressure or persuade
them. So that then when
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the greater meeting happened
in the evening,
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there would be many members
who would be willing
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to stand up and attest to
the consensus that had
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already been agreed upon
by the inner circles.
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And when there was a vote,
the measure would pass.
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So in effect, the inner
circles were
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able to direct the
society as a whole
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without appearing
to: because for
4:13
other members there
they would see,
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There's so many other people
who already think
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this way. I guess that's
the general opinion.
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I should go along with
it. A further feature
4:22
of the societies was that
it was a condition
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of membership that although
you had free thought
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and free discussion within
the society, outside
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you are expected to be bound by
the decisions of the society.
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So once the vote was taken,
that was the position
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that these men would express
in the outside world.
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So when the Revolution
happened, and many of
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the old structures and
the old hierarchies
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were torn down, it
was the societies,
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the men of the societies,
who stepped up
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and stepped into positions
of influence
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and the new chaotic systems
of government.
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Now the ideal of Revolutionary
France
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was that France would
be governed
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by the will of the people.
This is the idea of
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Rousseau. This is the ideal
of the Enlightenment.
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Direct democracy was the goal.
But how can the people rule,
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especially when they
don't actually have
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representatives? Because
revolutionary France
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did not have a parliament.
Well there were
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representatives in that
people were sent
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from the regions and from
towns to the center
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- and the societies engineered
that as well.
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They couldn't ensure that
they would be elected,
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that they would be voted
in when this process
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began, but what they could
do is ensure that
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others would not be chosen
by excluding them.
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They made rules about
this. They would say
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aristocrats should not
be eligible - but
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Jean here has demonstrated
that he is a true
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revolutionary so he should
be. And so they
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were able to get themselves
elected, Cochin
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says, by excluding the
competition and then
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making exemptions for themselves
on the basis of
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their virtue and their
revolutionary credentials.
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Now just as the inner
circles had been able
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to manage the ideas within
their societies,
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they came to be able to
do the same thing in
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France. Now France had
hundreds of societies,
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and they themselves formed
a hierarchy, and at
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the top was the Jacobin
society. And in effect
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they were able to launder
the ideas of the
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few to appear to be the
will of the majority.
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And the way it would
work was the same:
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the inner circles would
disseminate their
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ideas out to the individual
societies in
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the in the provinces
or the département,
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and then within those
societies the process
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would go to work. The
societies would vote,
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they would approve,
they would send
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back their message
to the center.
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The consequence was a
kind of control that
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appeared to go from the
edges to the center,
6:56
but had in fact originated
at the center, gone
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out to the edges, and
then come back again
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with the authority of
the popular will. It
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appeared that the people
ruled; in fact the
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societies ruled. And just
as within individual
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societies themselves a
counterfeit public opinion
7:16
came to appear to be the
majority opinion - and
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then it actually became
the majority opinion.
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And for those who were
recalcitrant - towns,
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for example, who didn't
want to go along with
7:27
new consensus - they could
get sent letters
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saying you are the only
one who doesn't agree.
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And in one instance, Cochin
said, sixty towns
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were sent letters, each
told that it was the
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only one that didn't agree.
Which of course
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was not the case, but
then the individual
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or the town or the community
that feels that it is
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the lone outlier falls in
line with the majority.
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Now it's characteristic
of this form of
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organization, Cochin says,
that it's leaderless,
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it's anonymous. These
inner circles have
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influence but they don't
have authority.
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And their power comes from
their anonymity. If
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it was seen that a few men
were leading France,
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that would be the end of
them: but so long as
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they were able to operate
effectively in secret,
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so long as they were able
to launder their power
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through the will of the people,
they held power.
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It was by exposing and
identifying their opponents
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that their opponents could
be taken down. But as
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long as they themselves kept
anonymity they were
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safe. The people were the
marionettes - that was
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the word they would use -
and they were the wire
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pullers. And they talked
about the entire system
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as a machine - and an
efficient machine it
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was. Cochin says one of
the evidences that
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it was the machine that
was guiding France
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was abrupt reversals of
policy and direction.
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When the people rule there's
no need to protect
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them from themselves. There's
no need for freedom
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of speech when the people
speak. There's no
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need for freedom of the
press when the people
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own the press. There's no
need for people to be
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protected by the courts
when the people judge.
9:07
And so this regime could
be exceptionally
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oppressive because it appeared
to be so free.
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As the regime established
itself, at first
9:16
people would go along
because they had
9:18
something to gain. They
had something to win
9:21
by conforming with the
consensus. They could
9:23
perhaps achieve a position
in the government.
9:25
Perhaps they could get work.
But as more and more
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people joined there were
fewer and fewer goodies
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to give out. And so in
order to get people
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to comply, the regime
had to shift from the
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carrot to the stick. Cochin
says the terror became
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more necessary when people
were more submissive.
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Public safety was a priority.
France did face
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real threats. It was at
war with its neighbors.
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There was basically civil
war in many of
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the regions, and there
were foreign spies,
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and there was immense chaos
and violence and
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shortages. But the regime
didn't really have
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the muscle to force people
in many instances to
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do what it wanted. Instead
it used surveillance.
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Not surveillance by the regime
itself so much as
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mutual surveillance. When
edicts were made they
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were sent out to the people
in such a way that
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people would monitor their
neighbors to make
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sure their neighbors weren't
taking advantage,
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to put towns and people
into competition where
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they were eager to report
on one another and
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monitor one another and
call one another out
10:34
in this atmosphere of fear of
threats of counter-revolution.
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Violence was seen
to be a good
10:41
thing. One of the
leaders, Marat,
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said, "Don't lay down your
gun until all our
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enemies are dead. This is
humanitarian advice."
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The result, Cochin says,
was a society of
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oppression - de facto
oppression, not de jure
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oppression. It wasn't the
laws in the government
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that forced people to do things
for the most part;
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it was the people forced
each other. The freedom
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of the Revolution, he says,
meant moral isolation.
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Quote: "The regime of
absolute freedom
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and equality . . . is
the most powerful
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one that can exist,
the most extensive,
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the most hierarchical,
the most stable,
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and the most demanding."
And the revolutionary
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man, the man who actually
managed things,
11:28
Cochin says, was the
bureaucrat. He was
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free of attachments. He
was free of pride,
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dignity, intelligence,
independence - these things
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he did not need. And when
the revolution ended,
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and when some of the murderers
of the Terror were
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brought to court, they did
not stand up and say,
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"I did this because I
had principles. I did
11:49
this because I believed
it was right." Instead
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they said something that
we heard in the 20th
11:54
century: "I did it because
I acted under orders
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now." As I say, what
interests me most
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about this is not the
Revolution itself.
12:05
There are continuing debates
about whether the
12:07
Revolution was a good
thing or a bad thing,
12:09
even whether the Terror was
a good thing or a bad thing,
12:12
and I don't particularly
want to get into that.
12:16
What interests me is the
comparison to today.
12:20
Like the hierarchy of
philosophical societies
12:23
that existed in Revolutionary
France,
12:25
societies where people
got together just to
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talk, not to do things,
disconnected from
12:30
their work-a-day lives -
just so, today we have
12:34
people who get together to
talk on social media.
12:38
And just as then the
philosophical societies
12:41
were not really tied to
activity in the world,
12:44
today most social media
is not tied to activity
12:47
in the world, not tied to
productive activity,
12:51
not tied to actual positions
of authority. And
12:54
so again inner circles have
tremendous influence.
12:58
Sometimes as inner circles
are hidden, sometimes
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they're formal. They might
be cliques of editors
13:04
on Wikipedia. They might
be moderators
13:06
on reddit or some other
discussion forum.
13:09
And they have tremendous
power to
13:11
influence the direction
of those forums
13:14
and the perception of what
majority opinion is.
13:18
And ideas develop in these
systems that can
13:21
be detached from reality,
and then emerge into
13:24
politics in the outside world
- not through formal
13:28
routes but through the informal
social pressure of
13:31
people who monitor the activity
and the beliefs of
13:34
other people and put pressure
on them to conform.
13:39
Now, as then, these are
movements without leaders,
13:42
movements with influence
but not authority,
13:45
movements where the most
important people may
13:48
be anonymous or almost
completely unknown.
13:52
Now, as then, many of the
most active individuals
13:55
are people who spend huge
amounts of time online
13:59
and little in the outside
world. Now, as then,
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many of the most active
influential people
14:05
online are much less
connected offline.
14:09
And now, as then, the opinions
of minorities can
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be laundered through these
forums to appear to
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be the opinions of majorities,
or at least
14:18
of large groups or pluralities
of people.
14:23
And while again there are
certain opportunities
14:26
to be had - positions to
be gained by adhering
14:29
to the dogma, by adhering
to the party line -
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for most people it's fear
of being called out
14:36
of being cancelled that
puts pressure on them
14:39
to conform. Cochin's summary
of the character
14:43
of the regime is striking.
He writes, "One does
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not generally imagine fanaticism
without faith,
14:50
discipline without
loyalty,
14:52
excommunication without
communion,
14:55
opprobrium without strong
active convictions -
14:58
no more than one imagines
a body without a soul."
15:03
This is Alphonse for Radio
Free Beszel, www.beszel.ca.
15:11
Good night.
